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I. INTRODUCTION 
The inductive reasoning test aptly titled, “The Duck Test,” provides, “If it walks like a 
duck, swims like a duck, and quacks like a duck, it's a duck.”1  Judge George Wu echoed this 
humorous sentiment in Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. Aereokiller (“FilmOn Cal”) holding that FilmOn, 
an Internet-based retransmission service, was a cable service as defined by 17 U.S.C § 111(f)(3) 
of the Copyright Act of 1976 (hereinafter the “Copyright Act”).2  Judge Wu did not rely on the 
legislative history or agency opinions—unlike the Second Circuit3—nor did he wax philosophical 
whether the Internet is a tangible place—unlike the District of Columbia (“DC”) District Court.4  
Instead Judge Wu based his opinion on the plain language of the law and used common sense to 
determine a facility in this context.  This comment focuses on the recent opinions from the Second 
Circuit, Central District of California, and DC District Court that address Internet retransmission 
services (sometimes referred to as “Internet TV”).  The issue in all three cases is whether an 
Internet retransmission system, which streams copyrighted television programming live and over 
the Internet, can qualify as a cable system for purposes of § 111 of the Copyright Act of 1976 and, 
therefore, be eligible to obtain a “compulsory license” to retransmit broadcast signals.5  To put it 
concisely, the arguments boil down to whether an Internet retransmission service is a cable system. 
The Copyright Act defines a cable system as follows: 
[A] facility, located in any State . . . that in whole or in part receives signals transmitted or programs 
broadcast by one or more television broadcast stations licensed by the FCC, and makes secondary 
                                                 
1 
See, e.g., GE Betz, Inc. v. Zee Co., 718 F.3d 615, 630 (7th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted) (determining whether “a 
participant in a judicial proceeding [that] has all the qualities of a defendant . . . [is], in fact, [] a defendant.”); BMC 
Indus. v. Barth Indus., 160 F.3d 1322, 1338 n. 28 (11th Cir. 1998) (The “duck test” has received wide support from 
the courts.). 
2 Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. Aereokiller, 115 F. Supp 3d 1152 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (“[I]t is difficult to recognize the 
ambiguity the Second Circuit saw in the statute, at least as applied to the facts of this case.”) (“FilmOn Cal”). 
3 WPIX, Inc. v. IVI, Inc., 691 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Ivi II”). 
4 Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X, LLC, No. 13-758, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161304 (DC Dist. Ct. Dec. 2, 2015) 
(“FilmOn DC”). 
5 Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 279. 
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transmissions of such signals or programs by wires, cables, microwave, or other communications 
channels to subscribing members of the public who pay for such service.6  
  
Parties that fall within this definition are eligible for a compulsory license granted by § 111.  A 
compulsory license is “[a] statutorily created license that allows certain parties to use copyrighted 
material[,] without the explicit permission of the copyright owner[,] in exchange for a special 
royalty.”7  Therefore, a compulsory license granted by § 111 allows a cable system, without the 
express consent of any copyright owner, to retransmit broadcast television programming to its 
subscribers for a statutorily imposed fee and subject to several regulations.8 
a. Potential Effect of FilmOn Cal 
The difference of opinion centers around two Internet retransmission companies—Ivi and 
FilmOn—and their respective trials in the Second Circuit, Central District Court of California, and 
DC District Court. Both companies argued their particular system was a cable system for purposes 
of § 111(c).9 
Applying Chevron deference, the Second Circuit held in Ivi II that Ivi was not a cable 
system for two separate reasons.10  First, the legislative history of § 111 suggests that an Internet 
retransmission company, such as Ivi, is not a cable company because: (1) Congress never expressly 
amended § 111 to apply to Internet retransmission services, and (2) Congress enacted the provision 
to address the difficulties of providing television reception by enabling the expansion of cable 
systems on a localized, rather than nationwide, platform—a purpose of which Ivi was not seeking 
                                                 
6 17 U.S.C. § 111(f)(3) (2015). 
7 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1060 (10th ed. 2014).  
8 Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 278. 
9 Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 279; FilmOn Cal 115 F. Supp. 3d at 1155-56; FilmOn DC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161304, at 
*18-19. 
10 Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 277. 
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to address.11  Second, the court adopted the agency’s interpretation of a cable system, which 
expressly excludes Internet retransmission services, under step two of Chevron deference.12 
In FilmOn Cal, Judge Wu broke with the Second Circuit and ruled in favor of Internet 
retransmission services, stating that FilmOn should be considered a cable system so long as it is 
able to show that its system meets other specific requirements, such as satisfying localization 
requirements and complying with applicable Federal Communications Commission (hereinafter 
“FCC”) regulations.13  Although the case is pending an appeal in the Ninth Circuit, FilmOn has 
claimed that its new system—the Lanner System14—has improved localization services and will 
placate the Copyright Office and broadcasters’ concerns.15 
Analyzing the very same definition that Ivi II and FilmOn Cal addressed, the court in 
FilmOn DC agreed with Ivi II’s outcome, but had a different line of reasoning.  Unlike the Second 
Circuit, the DC District Court did not find the definition of a cable system to be ambiguous and 
held FilmOn is not a cable system because it uses the Internet, a pathway that it does not control, 
to retransmit content to subscribers.16 Additionally, applying Skidmore deference, the DC court 
found the Copyright Office’s interpretation persuasive, and for this reason denied FilmOn a 
compulsory license.17 
 
 
                                                 
11 Id. at 281–83. 
12 Id. at 281–85. 
13 FilmOn Cal, 115 F. Supp. 3d at 1171. 
14 Id. at 1156. 
15 Id. at 1156–58; Margaret Harding McGill, FilmOn CEO Prods FCC to Bring Local Broadcast TV Online, 
LAW360 (Oct. 09, 2015, 7:24 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/713112/filmon-ceo-prods-fcc-to-bring-local-
broadcast-tv-online (FilmOn has expressed its willingness to abide by any applicable FCC regulations and has 
recently spoken to the FCC about the issue). 
16 FilmOn DC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161304, at *54–55. 
17 Id. at *76, 81. 
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b. Solution Summary 
This comment will argue that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals should affirm the FilmOn 
Cal decision and create a circuit split because the district court properly defined a cable system 
under the Copyright Act and FilmOn’s system fits within said definition. 
Part II of this comment will do the following: (1) summarize the history of cable systems and the 
compulsory license; (2) analyze the legislative intent behind the license; (3) provide an in-depth 
analysis of Ivi II, FilmOn Cal, FilmOn DC, and other related cases; and (4) discuss the philosophy 
that presently underlies the compulsory license.18  Part III will explain why the Ninth Circuit 
should affirm the FilmOn Cal decision and break with the Second Circuit and DC District Court.19 
II. BACKGROUND 
a. History: From Satellites on Hilltops to TV on Your Lap 
i. The Traditional Cable Systems 
The compulsory license emerged in response to two Supreme Court decisions from 1968 
and 1974, which held the traditional cable systems at issue were not “performing” under the 
Copyright Act when they retransmitted broadcasters’ programming.20  The first case, Fortnightly 
Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., dealt with a cable system that used antennas placed on hills 
above cities to distribute copyrighted local television broadcasting to their subscribers’ homes.21  
The Court determined that because the subscribers ultimately chose what they were viewing and 
the cable systems simply retransmitted uninterrupted and unedited programming, such systems did 
                                                 
18 See infra Part II. 
19 See infra Part III. 
20 These decisions referred to cable systems as Community Antenna Television (hereinafter “CATV”) systems.  
Courts and academics now refer to CATV systems as cable systems. ABC, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 U.S. 2498, 2505 
(2014) (“Aereo III”). 
21 Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 392 (1968). 
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not infringe any copyrights because the cable system functioned more like a viewer (who does not 
perform) than a broadcaster (who does perform).22  Therefore, Fortnightly allowed cable systems 
to retransmit copyrighted work to the masses and avoid paying rights holders for the 
retransmissions.  As cable systems evolved, the Supreme Court determined in Teleprompter v. 
Columbia Broad. Sys. that new features of cable systems (e.g. their own broadcasting channels 
and selling commercial space) were still non-infringing and allowed cable systems “to compete 
more effectively with broadcasters for the television market.”23  Fortnightly and Teleprompter 
essentially authorized cable systems “to retransmit broadcast television programming without 
incurring any costs to the copyright owners.”24 
ii. The Copyright Act of 1976 
  Congress—wanting to respect the rights of copyright holders and ensure that copyright 
holders received compensation for their works—made several amendments to the Copyright Act 
that affect cable systems.25  Congress enacted the § 111(c) compulsory license requiring cable 
systems pay copyright owners to retransmit the owners’ content.26  With this statute, Congress 
overturned Fortnightly and Teleprompter, declaring cable systems’ retransmissions to be 
performances and requiring cable systems pay a fee to retransmit such performances to the 
public.27  The compulsory license balances two ideals: the societal benefit cable systems provide 
(expansive access to television programming) with the significance of respecting one’s property 
rights.28  Further, Congress passed the statute to combat the undue burden of requiring cable 
                                                 
22 Id. at 400–01. 
23 Id. 
24 WPIX, Inc. v. Ivi, Inc. (“Ivi I”), 765 F. Supp. 2d 594, 602 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (emphasis added). 
25 Aereo III, 134 U.S. at 2506. 
26 Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 271. 
27 Aereo III, 134 U.S. at 2505. 
28 See Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 282; U.S. Copyright Office, Satellite Home Viewer Extension and Reauthorization 
Act Section 109 Report 1 (2008) at 1, 3 (hereinafter “SHVERA Report”). 
  
6 
systems to negotiate with each and every copyright owner to retransmit broadcast signals.29  The 
license is conditioned on reporting requirements, payment of royalties, a ban on the substitution 
or deletion of commercials, and geographical limitations on the license for programs broadcasted 
by Canadian or Mexican stations.30 
iii. Satellites 
  Not long after the amendments, satellite companies entered the retransmission market, 
requesting compulsory licenses.  In Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Satellite Broad. Networks, Inc., the 
Eleventh Circuit held that satellite carriers qualify as a cable system under § 111 and were entitled 
to compulsory licenses.31  Taking issue with this decision, the Copyright Office explained that 
satellites should not be entitled to a compulsory license because the localized intent of the license 
does not apply to national retransmission services and satellites are not regulated by the FCC.32  
  In response, Congress enacted the Satellite Home Viewer Act, which denied satellite 
carriers a § 111(c) compulsory license, but provided them a separate statutory license.33  Then in 
1999 Congress enacted 17 U.S.C. § 122, authorizing satellite carriers—once criticized for 
supporting a nationwide service—to retransmit local broadcast programming back into a local 
market.34  Congress has actively legislated in this area, amending § 122 five times since 2002.35  
iv. Internet Retransmission Services: The Aereo Decision 
                                                 
29 H.R. REP. 94-1476, at 5569, 5704 (1976). 
30 Id. at 5704. 
31 Nat’l Broad. Co. v. Satellite Broad. Networks, Inc., 940 F.2d 1467, 1471 (11th Cir. 1991). 
32 57 Fed. Reg. 3284 (Jan. 29, 1992) (codified at 37 C.F.R. § 201.17). 
33  See 17 U.S.C. § 119; 56 Fed. Reg. 31,580 (1991); 57 Fed. Reg. 3283 (1992). 
34 FilmOn DC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161304, at *56 n.17. 
35 FilmOn Cal, 115 F. Supp. 3d at 1162. 
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  The most recent development within this area of law (as well as the central focus of this 
comment) is Aereo III, where the Supreme Court determined that an Internet-based retransmission 
service publicly performs through its retransmissions of copyright owners’ content.36 
  Aereo—which is now defunct—provided retransmissions of TV broadcasts through 
thousands of small antennas, each of which were attributed to a single, active Aereo subscriber at 
any time (i.e., no two Aereo subscribers would be assigned the same antenna at once).37  The 
subscriber first selected a channel for Aereo’s services to translate into data that could be used 
over the Internet.38  The data was saved to one of Aereo’s servers and retransmitted to that 
individual’s computer for streaming.39  If two subscribers clicked to view the same programming 
at the same time, they would each receive an individual copy made for them, but of the same 
material.40  
  Aereo’s main argument paralleled the arguments made by the cable systems in Fortnightly 
and Teleprompter.41  Aereo argued that it does not publicly perform the copyright, but rather 
provides equipment; any performance that may occur happens at the hands of the subscriber.42  If 
the court agreed that Aereo’s retransmissions do not constitute a public performance, then Aereo 
would not be infringing the copyrights of the content it displayed. Additionally, Aereo argued that 
it only created and retransmitted personal copies of the content to their subscribers because there 
was only one active subscriber for any one antenna.43  The Supreme Court disagreed, ruling: (1) 
Aereo was not just an equipment provider because their systems perform copyrighted material, 
                                                 
36 Aereo III, 134 U.S. at 2511. 
37 Id. at 2503. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 2511. 
42 Id. at 2504. 
43 Id. at 2508–09. 
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and (2) Aereo performs when it publicly displays “the same contemporaneous[] [programming to 
multiple people]” (i.e., the public)—despite its “personal copies” assertion.44  Therefore, Internet 
retransmission services, like Aereo, publicly perform when they retransmit copyrighted works.  
Absent a license from the proper rights holders, such retransmissions infringe the copyright 
holders’ rights. 
  In its opinion, the Supreme Court noted Aereo’s system bore an “overwhelming likeness 
to the cable companies targeted by the 1976 amendments” and stated an Internet-based service’s 
overall commercial objective is no different than a cable companies.45  Further, at oral argument 
Justice Sonia Sotomayer stated, “I look at the definition of a cable company, and [Aereo] seems 
to fit.”46  Using these comments, Aereo raised a new argument on remand in the SDNY: the 
comparisons laid out in the opinion and Justice Sotomayer’s statements held, or at the very least 
inferred, Aereo was a cable system.47  In a short opinion, the court dismissed the notion that such 
statements or comments could have any legal effect and that the analogies made between cable 
systems and the CATV systems were only for the purposes of finding Aereo to publicly perform.48  
The court stated that simply because Aereo was found to perform publicly does not render it a 
cable system.49   
b. Congress and the Copyright Office on the Compulsory License 
i. Legislative Intent 
                                                 
44 Id. at 2506, 2510. 
45 Id. at 2508. 
46 Joe Mullin, Analysis: New Motions Show Gaping Holes in Supreme Court’s Ruling, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 04, 
2014, 4:52 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/08/aereo-tells-court-its-bleeding-to-death-
but-gets-no-relief/. 
47 ABC v. Aereo, Inc., 12-cv-1540, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150555, at *17 (several other failed defenses were raised) 
(“Aereo IV”). 
48 Id. at *19–20 (“only the justices written opinions have the force of law”). 
49 Id. at *18. 
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Congress created § 111 to balance the societal benefits a cable system provides to the 
viewing public, with the security that must be honored and upheld with a copyright.50  Further, 
Congress was aware of the impracticality of requiring a potential cable system to negotiate with 
every individual copyright owner it wished to retransmit.51  In order to address these competing 
interests, it created a statutorily defined royalty.52  
ii. Copyright Office’s Interpretation 
The Copyright Office does not believe Internet retransmission services should qualify for 
a compulsory license.53  They consider some differences, such as the nature of delivery, to be 
fundamental and urge the withholding of a license.54  Their principal concern, however, is whether 
Internet retransmissions can be controlled geographically.55  The localization of transmissions 
serves several ends, such as allowing broadcasters to sell advertising space based on region and 
deliver content to viewers in different time zones appropriately.56 
The Copyright Office first examined the issue presented by Internet retransmission services 
in 1999, determining that it was too early to grant the services a compulsory license.  In subsequent 
years, the Copyright Office has made clear its position that Internet retransmission services should 
not receive compulsory licenses.57  However, when discussing “new distribution technologies” in 
a recent report, the Copyright Office included the following statement: 
To be clear, the Office is not against new distribution models that use Internet protocol to deliver 
programming, but only opposes the circumstance where any online content aggregator would have 
the ability to use a statutory license to sidestep private agreements and free from any of the 
                                                 
50 Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 281. 
51 See supra Part II.a (The Copyright Act of 1976). 
52 See supra Part II.a (The Copyright Act of 1976). 
53 Letter from J. Charlesworth, Copyright Office General Counsel (July 23, 2014), Pls.’ Appx. Ex. 1 at 3. 
54 
Statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual 
Property, Committee on the Judiciary (June 15, 2000). 
55 Letter of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights to the honorable Howard Coble (Nov. 10, 1999) (“Our principal 
concern is the extent to which Internet retransmissions of broadcast signals can be controlled geographically”). 
56 Ivi II 691 F.3d at 285. 
57 Statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual 
Property, Committee on the Judiciary (June 15, 2000) 
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limitations imposed on cable operators and satellite carriers by the Communications Act and the 
FCC’s rules.58 
 
Additionally, the Office has acknowledged the issues presented by such an innovation are 
entangled with communications law and policy issues, the analysis of which is outside their 
expertise.59 
iii. Current Ideology of the Compulsory License 
Internet retransmission services are not alone in being scrutinized by the Copyright Office; 
the Office actually has a longstanding opposition to the compulsory license itself.60  The Copyright 
Office believes the compulsory license allows cable systems to carry local signals for a de minimis 
fee and that a government-administered license “prevents the marketplace from deciding the fair 
value of copyrighted works.”61  They see a better solution as allowing representatives from the 
several industries involved and the users to negotiate terms.62 
c. Ivi II, FilmOn Cal, and FilmOn DC 
This section will discuss the systems and business model of the respective Internet 
retransmission systems of Ivi and FilmOn and will further unpack each court’s analysis of the 
issue.  Finally, it will situate the discussion within the greater, national context by examining one 
other case from the Southern District of New York (hereinafter the “SDNY”) where the same issue 
and argument took place. 
i. Ivi II 
                                                 
58 
U.S. Copyright Office, SHVERA Report (2008) at 188. 
59 Copyright Office STELA Report (Aug. 29, 2011), Pls.’ Appendix, Ex. 3 at 16. 
60 Statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual 
Property, Committee on the Judiciary (June 15, 2000) 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
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Ivi’s system worked like most cable systems because it captured and retransmitted 
broadcast signals from stations located across the country; the system differed from cable systems 
in two ways: 
(1) rather than being restricted to one’s local market broadcasting, any Ivi subscriber 
was able to view, without altering their computer settings, live streams from any local 
station in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, or Seattle;63 and 
(2) Ivi’s service did not comply with the applicable rules, regulations, or authorizations 
of the FCC.64 
After transmitting the signal to their subscribers, Ivi rendered the content unusable and prevented 
it from being viewed, captured, or passed along by its consumers.65   
To determine the statute’s intent, Ivi II applied Chevron deference.66  Chevron deference 
is generally warranted when an agency’s interpretation of the statute is available, almost always 
through formal notice.67  Chevron first requires the court to “consider whether Congress has clearly 
spoken on the issue.”68  If such intent is clear, no more analysis need be done, but if it appears 
ambiguous the court must turn to the legislative history to determine the statute’s intent.69  If still 
no affirmative intent can be gathered, step two instructs the court to “defer to an agency’s 
interpretation of the statute, so long as it is reasonable.”70 
                                                 
63 Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 282. 
64 Ivi I, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 599.  
65 Id. at 298. 
66 Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 279. 
67 FilmOn DC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161304, at *69 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230–31 
(2001)).   
68 Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 279 (citing Cohen v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 498 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 2007)) 
69 Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 279. 
70 Id. (internal quotations omitted) 
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In applying step one, the court found Congress’s intent unclear.71  Specifically, the court 
could not conclude whether Ivi’s “service (1) is or utilizes a ‘facility’ (2) that receives and 
retransmits signals (3) through [a prescribed communication channel].”72  Ivi attempted to fit 
within the definition of a cable system, arguing that it operated plainly a facility per the definition 
of a cable system; however, Ivi never “identified the location or nature of its facility.”73  
Since the court found § 111(f)(3) to be ambiguous, it looked to the legislative history and 
found that § 111’s intent was to address the issues of reception and remote access to broadcasting 
that supports localized, not nationwide, systems. 74   This analysis proscribed the compulsory 
license from applying to Ivi’s system because it provided nationwide service.75  To remove any 
doubt about the validity of its interpretation of the statute, the court moved on to step two of the 
Chevron analysis and applied the Copyright Office’s interpretation of § 111 as it pertains to 
Internet retransmission services.76  The court sided with the Copyright Office’s interpretation, 
finding it “reasonable and persuasive.”77 
ii. FilmOn Cal 
Just prior to litigation, FilmOn employed two different retransmission systems: (a) a trailer 
system, and (b) a Lanner system.78  The trailer system was largely similar to Aereo’s and was 
subsequently destroyed by FilmOn prior to litigation.79  The Lanner system, on the other hand, 
features “a single master antenna placed on the roof of a commercial data center, which routes 
                                                 
71 Id. at 280. 
72 Id. (emphasis added). 
73 Id. at 280 n.6. 
74 See supra Part II.a (The Copyright Act of 1976) 
75 Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 284. 
76 Id. at 283. 
77 Id. at 284.  See supra Part II.b (ii). 
78 FilmOn Cal, 115 F. Supp. 3d at 1156. 
79 Id. at 1158 n.7. 
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signals to an antenna box where the signals are amplified and captured by small antennas.”80  The 
user then selects a program to watch from a list on FilmOn’s website and that program is 
transmitted to their computer via FilmOn’s servers via the Internet.81  As a way of managing a 
subscriber’s access to their respective local channels, FilmOn processes its subscribers’ requests 
from a local facility within a subscriber’s region.82  In anticipation of their case in the Ninth Circuit, 
FilmOn also modified their system to enhance their localization services by requiring: (1) a user’s 
credit card address and (2) a viewing device to be in the market area of which it was receiving.83  
FilmOn’s system also employs a security measure in the form of an “encryption token” that ensures 
the user with the authorized IP address is the only one able to access the broadcast stream.84  
FilmOn, unlike Ivi, focused its arguments and efforts leading up to litigation on closing the 
alleged gap between a more traditional cable system and their system: 
(1) FilmOn restarted their operations as a Multichannel Video Programming Distributor to 
better fit within the FCC regulations;85 
(2) FilmOn announced—and continues to express—their willingness and ability to comply 
with all applicable regulations, including FCC ones;86 and 
(3) FilmOn’s system employs several localization safeguards to ensure subscribers are viewing 
only their local markets.87 
                                                 
80 Id. at 1156. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id at *9–10. 
84 Id. at 1157. 
85 Id. at 1159 (“a multichannel video programming distributor (MVPD) is any person such as . . . a cable operator, a 
multichannel multipoint distribution service, a direct broadcast satellite service, or a television receive-only satellite 
program distributor, who makes available for purchase, by subscribers or customers, multiple channels of video 
programming”). 
86 Id. at 1170. 
87 Id. at 1156–58. 
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Proving their eagerness to operate accordingly, FilmOn mailed over a hundred letters to 
broadcasters requesting knowledge of whether the broadcasters would elect “must-carry” status as 
required by FCC regulations.88   Additionally, per the Copyright Office’s compulsory license 
requirements, FilmOn submitted to them their statements of accounting and paid corresponding 
fees. 89 
Breaking from Ivi II, the court in FilmOn Cal did not inquire into the legislative history or 
move onto the second step of Chevron because it did not have the same questions as Ivi II, 
determining Congress’s definition of a cable system to be clear.90  Namely, Judge Wu did not 
probe whether the Internet is a facility.91  The buildings located wholly in particular states and host 
FilmOn’s retransmitting antennas are the facilities.92  Before any content is retransmitted, these 
physical facilities receive the broadcasters’ signals.93  From there the content it retransmitted via 
“wires, cables, microwave, or other communication channels to the corresponding subscribers.”94  
Therefore, per the Copyright Act’s definition of a cable system, FilmOn maintains and controls 
the facilities that are used for the retransmissions and the operation that in fact precedes the Internet 
in FilmOn’s scheme. 95   The court went on to distinguish Ivi II by determining the terms 
“headends” and “contiguous communities” do not have any bearing on the definition of a cable 
system, but “merely provide[] that certain commonly owned cable systems will be treated as a 
single system for purposes of computing a royalty.”96  As such, due to the unambiguous, express 
                                                 
88 Id. at 1159. 
89 Id. at 1159 (during this period FilmOn failed to pay royalties to the opposing parties involved in this matter). 
90 Id. at 1167 (“[I]t is difficult to recognize he ambiguity the Second Circuit saw in the statute, at least as applied to 
the facts of this case”). 
91 Id. 
92 Id at 1167 (adding that the Copyright Office employed a “strange reading of the words ‘facility’ and 
‘communications’ channel,” and that Ivi II’s reading of § 111 was “overly narrow”). 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at *40. 
95 Id. at 1167–68 (emphasis added). 
96 Id. at 1168. 
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language of Congress, the court stopped at the first step of Chevron deference, deciding that 
FilmOn was a cable system and therefore entitled to a compulsory license granted under § 111.97  
No legislative history analysis or agency deference would be necessary as stipulated through 
Chevron deference.98  
iii. FilmOn DC 
Less than five months after Judge Wu’s decision, FilmOn DC, a concurrent case involving 
the same parties as FilmOn Cal and over the same matter, concluded, but reached a different 
result—while the verdict had the same overall outcome as Ivi II, the DC court’s analysis was 
different.99  The court first held that FilmOn’s reliance on the Internet rendered it incapable of 
being a cable system under § 111(f)(3) because its physical facilities first retransmit the signals to 
Internet service providers, as opposed to the subscribers directly.100  Despite the fact that FilmOn’s 
system uses “cables, wires, and microwaves,” it involves a process that utilizes “a global network 
of interconnected computers.”101  The court interpreted § 111(f)(3) to read, “any system that fails 
to encompass the distribution medium and does not retransmit the signals directly to the subscriber 
does not qualify as a cable system.” 102   Since FilmOn does not control the entirety of its 
retransmissions path to subscribers it is not a cable system.103  Specifically, the court found Internet 
retransmission systems differ from the cable systems in 1976 that “controlled the entire 
transmission path leading directly to the subscribers.”104 
                                                 
97 Id. at 1171. 
98 Id. at 1166. 
99 FilmOnDC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161304, at *55. 
100 Id. at *54 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at *55. 
103 Id. at *55. 
104 Id. *57–58 (“The Internet also relies on multiple other types of distribution media, such as satellite, cellular 
networks, and wifi”) 
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The court also denied the language, “or other communications channels” in § 111(c) 
expressed Congress’s intent for the compulsory license to encompass evolving technologies.105 
The court cited the ancient canon ejusdem generis, which “teach[es] that when a statute sets out a 
series of specific items ending with a general term, that general term is confined to covering 
subjects comparable to the specifics it follows.”106  The court concluded that the Internet is not 
similar to or of the same kind as “wires, cables, or microwave” because it “operates through 
nebulous international connections in cyberspace thus not constituting a ‘channel’ similar to 
‘wires, cables or microwave.’”107 
Additionally, the court broke from Ivi II by denying to apply Chevron deference due to the 
absence of any formal rulemaking by the Copyright Office.108  Instead, the DC court applied 
Skidmore deference.109  When determining whether to apply Skidmore deference, courts must 
“look to the degree of [an] agency’s care, its consistency, formality, and relative expertness, and 
to the persuasiveness of the agency’s position.”110  The court found that the Copyright Office has 
consistently interpreted § 111(f)(3) to deny Internet retransmission services are cable systems 
because they are not “an inherently localized transmission media of limited availability.111  The 
court found this interpretation “persuasive because it is grounded in the statute’s text and 
legislative history,” and, therefore, allowed Skidmore deference to be applied.112  Due to the 
                                                 
105 Id. at *60–61. 
106 Id. at 61. 
107 Id. (brackets omitted).  The court also refused a broad interpretation because it may violate international 
obligations.  Id. at *65. 
108 Id. at *69–71 (“the Court will not apply Chevron deference in the absence of formal rulemaking here because the 
Copyright Office issued regulations after notice-and-comment in other situations, such as those concerning satellite 
carriers”) 
109 Id. at *71. 
110 Id. at *71. 
111 Id. at *75–76. 
112 Id. at *75–76. 
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Internet’s worldwide capabilities, the court held FilmOn’s system is not inherently localized and 
is inconsistent with the Copyright Office’s interpretation.113 
 
 
d. Other Similar Cases 
i. FilmOn SDNY 
Following Aereo III, FilmOn relied on the comparisons made by the Supreme Court 
between the traditional cable systems in Fortnightly and Teleprompter and Internet retransmission 
systems, arguing that in light of such comparisons, FilmOn qualifies as a cable system.114  The 
court disagreed, holding FilmOn placed “too much importance” on the Supreme Court’s cable 
system analogies, and that such analogies were “not the same as a judicial finding” that Aereo is a 
cable system.115  Further, the court relied on its precedent from Ivi II.116 
e. Current State of the Law 
 Unlike with the satellite carriers, Congress has yet to codify a statutory provision for 
Internet-based retransmission services, despite several courts litigating the issue.117  In addition, 
despite the well-documented history of displeasure from the Copyright Office,118 the compulsory 
license remains an integral part in providing broadcasting to the public and continues to be relied 
upon for business arrangements.  This leaves Internet TV with nowhere to turn but the courts in 
their fight to provide the public with a new, yet familiar way to consume broadcasting. 
i. FCC Taking Sides? 
                                                 
113 Id. at *78. 
114 CBS Broad., Inc. v. FilmOn.com (“FilmOn SDNY”), 10 Civ. 7532 (NRB), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101894, at *9 
(S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2014). 
115 Id. at *11 
116 Id. at *12 
117 Ivi I, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 616. 
118 See supra Part II.b (iii) 
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The FCC is in the process of creating a proposal to determine whether Internet-based 
services qualify as “multichannel video programming distributors” (hereinafter “MVPD”) under 
communications law.119  The FCC Chairman summarized the proposed regulations:  
With this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the Commission moves to update the Commission’s rules 
to give video providers who operate over the internet—or any method of transmission—the same 
access to programming that cable and satellite operators have. Big company control over access to 
programming should not keep programs from being available over the Internet.120 
 
The proposal would widen the FCC’s interpretation of MVPD to include any technology 
that provides a linear stream or programming (i.e., services that provide scheduled TV 
programming without DVR systems).121  Therefore, the outcome of this proposal may very well 
decree Internet retransmission services compatible with FCC regulations.  In FilmOn Cal Judge 
Wu acknowledged this, but stated the notice would not affect his decision.122 
III. ANALYSIS 
This section will set out the arguments for why the Ninth Circuit should affirm its district 
court’s decision holding FilmOn’s Internet retransmission service to be a cable system for purposes 
of § 111 of the Copyright Act.  First, the application of Chevron deference in Ivi II is misapplied 
because it is not at all obvious that that style of deference was warranted as the opinion’s missing 
analysis would have you believe, and if any agency deference were to be applied, the Copyright 
Office’s reasoning does not apply to FilmOn because FilmOn’s system answers their primary 
concerns about Internet retransmission services.123  Second, Judge Wu provided a straightforward, 
fair reading of § 111(f)(3) and correctly determined FilmOn’s Internet-based service fits well 
                                                 
119 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (hereinafter “NPM”), In the Matter of Promotional Innovation and Competition 
in the Provision of Multichannel Video Programming Distribution Services, MB Docket No. 14-261, FCC 14-210 
(Dec. 19, 2014) (emphasis added). 
120 Id. 
121 Id.  
122 FilmOn Cal, 115 F. Supp. 3d at 1170. 
123 See infra Part III.a. 
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within it.124  Finally, the Ninth Circuit should take notice of the several analogies made between 
Internet retransmission systems and cable systems throughout the several Internet TV opinions; 
while it may not definitively show that the systems are cable systems, it provides further evidence 
of their striking similarities.125  
a. Agency Deference 
i. The Second Circuit’s Misapplication of Chevron Deference 
By applying Chevron deference, Ivi II held that Ivi was not a cable system by looking at 
the legislative history of the compulsory license and definition of a cable system.126  To begin this 
analysis, the Second Circuit stated, “[T]he Copyright Office . . . has spoken on the issue of whether 
§ 111’s compulsory licenses extend to Internet retransmissions.  Accordingly, we utilize [Chevron 
deference].”127  This bare assertion, however, is not a correct analysis of the law because Chevron 
deference is not simply warranted merely by an agency’s interpretation through administrative 
statements.128  The scope of when Chevron deference may be applied has been limited by recent 
decisions. 129   Generally, interpretations that lack the force of law do not warrant Chevron 
deference (e.g., opinion letters, policy statements, agency manuals).130  Even though the absence 
of a final regulation is not necessarily determinative, “the overwhelming number of cases [that 
have applied] Chevron deference have reviewed the fruits of notice and comment rulemaking or 
formal adjudication.”131  
                                                 
124 See infra Part III.b(i). 
125 See infra Part III.b(ii). 
126 Ivi II, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 289 (emphasis added). 
127 Id. at 279 (emphasis added). 
128 FilmOnDC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161304, at *68–69. 
129 Id. 
130 Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000). 
131 FilmOn DC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161304, at *69 (citing Mead, 533 U.S. at 219) (quotation marks omitted). 
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The Copyright Office, although consistently opining that Internet retransmission services 
are not entitled to compulsory licensing, has never issued regulations formally on the matter.132  
Its position comes from a collection of statements, policy documents, and congressional 
testimonies.133  Having to speculate why the Second Circuit did what it did, FilmOn DC refused 
to follow Ivi II due to the Second Circuit’s failure to explain why Chevron deference was 
warranted.134  While the absence of a final regulation may not be determinative, “the Copyright 
Office [has] issued [formal] regulations . . . in other [similar] situations, such as those concerning 
satellite carriers,” but clearly refused here despite their continuing statements on the matter.135 
Ivi II was as much an administrative law decision as it was a copyright law one.  Given the 
Copyright Office’s longstanding opposition to Internet retransmission systems, and the 
compulsory license in general, it is no surprise that the Second Circuit ruled against Internet 
retransmission systems.  Chevron deference should not have been applied in Ivi II because of the 
lack of formal rulemaking from the Copyright Office. 
ii. Eliminating the Copyright Office’s Concerns 
Although Ivi II and FilmOn DC did not apply the same degree of deference, the two courts 
still utilized the same set of facts and opinions expressed by the Copyright Office.  The Office’s 
stance on the issue expressly rejects the idea that a service such as FilmOn could constitute a cable 
system.136  Utilizing Chevron deference, Ivi II adopted this interpretation, while FilmOn DC 
employing, Skidmore deference, acknowledged the Office’s views were persuasive.137 
                                                 
132 Id. at *69. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at *69–71. 
136 See supra Part II.b(ii). 
137 FilmOnDC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161304, at *80–81. 
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The Copyright Office’s interpretation of § 111, supports the notion to qualify for a 
compulsory license, a cable system must retransmit localized content.138  While there should be no 
doubt to this, this was a major concern in Ivi II because Ivi’s service was not at all localized, 
allowing for a subscriber in New York to stream a Seattle broadcast.139  FilmOn, however, is the 
catalyst in this equation because, unlike Ivi, FilmOn fully supports localization and plans to prove 
that their system is capable of retransmitting localized broadcasts to the appropriate subscribers 
within their specific region.140  As noted by FilmOn Cal and FilmOn DC, FilmOn has implemented 
several measures to ensure their retransmissions are properly localized. 141   Therefore, the 
Copyright Office’s geographical concern with Internet retransmission services in general, as cited 
by the Ivi II and FilmOn DC decisions, will not apply to FilmOn so long as FilmOn can show on 
appeal their service’s proficient localization measures.142 
Another attribute of § 111 is that its “operation . . . hinge[s] on the FCC rules regulating 
the cable industry.”143  Similar to the above analysis, FilmOn is not arguing that they will not or 
cannot comply with FCC regulations, as Ivi did.144  Instead, FilmOn understands the importance 
of compliance and has expressed its willingness and capability to observe all appropriate FCC 
regulations. 145   Additionally, the Copyright Office has given compulsory licenses to similar 
Internet retransmission companies like AT&T U-Verse and Verizon Fios, which are not subject to 
the Communications Act.146  Finally, the FCC is in the process of creating a proposal that would 
                                                 
138 See supra Part II.b(ii). 
139 See supra Part II.b(ii). 
140 See supra Part II.c(i). 
141 See supra Part II.c(iii). 
142 FilmOn Cal, 115 F. Supp. 3d at 1171. 
143 Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 284. 
144 FilmOn Cal, 115 F. Supp. 3d at 1170. 
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146 The FCC governs those subject to the Communications Act.  
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allow Internet retransmission services to fall within their regulation.147  Despite opposition from 
many of the same plaintiffs in the FilmOn and Ivi cases, FCC Chairman Tom Wheeler has recently 
advocated to expand the definition of a cable system from the traditional definition utilized by the 
FCC, to allow for a more competitive market.148 
 
 
b. If It Walks Like a Duck . . .  
The Ninth Circuit should affirm the District Court’s decision, holding FilmOn to be a cable 
system under the Copyright Act because FilmOn operates physical facilities that receive 
broadcaster signals and retransmit those signals; this is to say that the Internet is not the receiving 
“facility,” per § 111(f)(3).  Additionally, providing some clarity to a controversial question, 
FilmOn and its competitors mirror cable systems in seemingly every way.149 
i. “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, 
as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed 
intent of Congress.”150 
Applying the definition of a cable system, Ivi II and FilmOn DC both stopped at the same 
inquiry: Is the Internet a facility?151  Ivi II left its inquiry at “unclear,” but acknowledged that the 
Internet is not a “tangible entity” that is required of a physical facility.152  FilmOn DC stated the 
Internet could not be a facility as defined by § 111(f)(3).153  
                                                 
147 See supra Part II.e. 
148 See supra Part II.e. 
149 See infra Part III.a (2) 
150 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resourses Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 841–43 (1984). 
151 See Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 280; FilmOnDC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161304, at *53. 
152 Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 280 (“[the Internet] is neither a physical nor a tangible entity; rather, it is ‘a global network of 
millions of intercnneced computers.” (Citations omitted)). 
153 FilmOnDC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161304, at *53. 
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The definition of a cable system on its face requires: (1) there to be a facility that “receives” 
the broadcasters’ signals; (2) that that facility be located in a state or territory; and (3) that the 
facility retransmit the signals via “wires, cables, microwaves, or other communication channels to 
subscribing members of the public.”  The definition does not limit cable systems to those that 
“encompass the distribution medium,” nor does it require a system’s retransmissions be “direct.”154 
FilmOn Cal—rather than “focus[ing] on the mysterious ‘ether’” (a/k/a the Internet)—
simply found that FilmOn’s “antennas, located in particular buildings wholly within particular 
states,” are the receiving facilities in accordance with § 111(f)(3). 155   These facilities then 
retransmit the signals through familiar means, such as “wires, cables, microwave, or other 
communication channels.”156  Therefore, the Internet is not the facility here.157  As FilmOn Cal 
observed, all of the electrical instrumentalities—which FilmOn has control over and operates—
precede the Internet in its operation.158  Therefore, applying § 111’s definition of a cable system 
to the facts, FilmOn’s operational facilities receive the signals, are physically located in several 
states, and retransmit the signals through a prescribed communication channel to a localized 
geographical region.  Additionally, despite what FilmOn DC held, § 111(f)(3) makes no mention 
of a requirement for signals to directly retransmit to subscribers. 159   Furthermore, even if 
legislative history purports otherwise, that history was broken when AT&T Uverse and Verizon 
Fios were granted a § 111(c) compulsory license because they use the Internet.  
Next Ivi II and FilmOn DC, agreeing with the Copyright Office, stated the terms 
“headends” and “contiguous communities,” found in the second sentence of the cable system 
                                                 
154 Id. at *55 
155 FilmOn Cal, 115 F. Supp. 3d at 1167–68. 
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definition, evinced a localized service and not a nationwide one; providing further proof that 
Internet-based retransmission services system are not cable systems.160  This should not affect the 
Ninth Circuit’s determination because: (1) as Judge Wu held, the second sentence of the definition 
of cable system is intended to distinguish “larger [cable] system[s] for purposes of the royalty 
determination,” instead of modifying the definition of cable systems; and (2) even if we were to 
accept this reading, FilmOn’s service still fits within it so long as localization safeguards exist. 161  
To the first point, larger cable systems are treated as a single one to ensure they may contribute 
larger per-subscriber royalty payments—this is the extent of this sentence’s purpose.162  To the 
latter point, FilmOn has recently implemented a litany of localization measures and Judge Wu 
granted them the opportunity to display such safeguards on appeal.163  So long as they do so, 
FilmOn will have removed its service from the likes of national ones (e.g. satellites, Aereo, and 
Ivi) and rendered itself compatible with the localized intent of § 111. 
ii. Likened to Cable Systems 
It is not uncommon for a company to often be involved in reoccurring litigation with the 
same issue or entity.  Several overlapping broadcasting companies were Internet TV’s adversaries 
in the FilmOn, Aereo, and Ivi cases.  Aereo’s litigation dealt with a separate issue: whether an 
Internet retransmission service publicly performs.164  Throughout Aereo III the Supreme Court 
made undeniable comparisons between Aereo’s system and the traditional cable systems.  
The Supreme Court in Aereo III explicitly related Aereo to cable systems in its opinion.165  
First, after analyzing the history of the copyright act and compulsory license, the Court noted 
                                                 
160 Ivi II, 691 F.3d at 284. 
161 FilmOn Cal, 115 F. Supp. 3d at 1167–68 
162 Id. 
163 Id. at *50–51. 
164 Aereo III, 134 U.S. at 2511. 
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Aereo’s activities were “substantially similar” to traditional cable systems. 166   Immediately 
following this sentence the Supreme Court cited a House Report, which stated a cable system’s 
main operation is “based on the carriage of copyrighted program material.” 167   Second, the 
Supreme Court noted any technological differences between Aereo’s system and cable systems—
not just traditional cable systems—did not distinguish Aereo’s system in general, its commercial 
objective, nor its subscribers’ viewing experience.168 
FilmOn SDNY and Aereo IV dismissed the argument that such remarks by the Supreme 
Court established Internet retransmission services as cable systems.169  The courts were correct 
that this was not the holding in Aereo III and the respective Internet retransmission companies 
were misguided to only argue this, however, to dismiss the Supreme Court’s unambiguous 
analogies would be another kind of fallacy.  The courts limited the quotes to only bear on the issue 
of public performance for purposes of the Transmit Clause, but their words and placement may 
suggest more.  Firstly, the court in Aereo IV mischaracterized the analogies as only pertaining to 
traditional cable systems because the second example in the preceding paragraph describes an 
instance where the Supreme Court relates it to cable systems in general; cable systems commercial 
objective; and the eventual subscriber viewing experience.170  In examining the Transmit Clause, 
the Supreme Court made clear the general operation of a cable system is no different than Internet 
retransmission systems.  This is to say that Aereo, and by comparison other Internet TV systems, 
                                                 
one thing, the history of cable broadcast transmissions that led to the enactment of the Transmit Clause informs our 
conclusion that Aereo ‘perform[s]’”). 
166 Aereo III at 2506, 2510. 
167 Id. 
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26 
communicate retransmissions to subscribers analogous to those cable systems already entitled to 
compulsory licensing. 
Furthermore, the antagonistic broadcast companies even argued in Aereo II “that Aereo’s 
[re]transmissions of broadcast television programs . . . are analogous to the retransmissions of 
network programming made by cable systems.”171  The broadcasters would go on to declare 
Aereo’s system was “functionally equivalent to a cable television provider.” 172   Given the 
analogies made by the Supreme Court and the broadcast companies, once FilmOn is able to display 
its improved localization safeguards and comply with applicable regulations, what more bridges 
need be gapped to show it is a cable system?  Indeed an implication is not a holding, but it is a 
significant connection that the Ninth Circuit should take notice of in its impending decision. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Ivi II, FilmOn Cal, and FilmOn DC decisions provide insight to how one statute can 
be interpreted several different ways.  The decision can become more confusing when legislative 
history from 40 years ago and an agency’s opinion enter the fray.  FilmOn Cal establishes the best, 
clear-cut interpretation of § 111.  By reading the statute for what it is and correctly refraining from 
the Copyright Office’s discouraging opinion, Judge Wu was able to correctly determine that 
FilmOn’s system is a cable system within the definition and would be entitled to a compulsory 
license following a display of its improved measures. 
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